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Interpreters of Plato’s Cratylus are faced with a puzzle. If Socrates’ etymologies (397a-421c) 
are intended to be parodies, as many have thought,1 what is the status of the imitation theory of 
letters (421c-427d), which provides the theoretical foundation for etymology and, as some have 
thought, indicates Plato’s ambition to construct an ideal language?2 In this paper, I focus on 
three questions: [1] whether Plato thought that imitation provided a suitable basis for an ideal 
language; [2] whether Plato thought that the development of an ideal language would be 
philosophical possible or desirable; [3] whether he thought that ordinary language is unsuitable 
for philosophical discourse. I argue, first, that Plato provides two arguments against imitation 
grounding an ideal language; second, that one can reconstruct three independent arguments 
against the possibility and desirability of ideal language; and, third, that his own use of ordinary 
language at least tells against the idea that Plato thought it unsuitable for philosophical 
discourse. I aim to contribute to the scholarly debate about Plato’s attitude towards an ideal 
language by laying out, in a maximally clear way, what I take to be the relevant arguments and 
by introducing Plato’s own use of language as relevant evidence. 
  
I.  Against Ideal Imitations  
Socrates describes what looks like an ideal language while in the process of formulating the 
imitation theory of letters. He says: 
We’ll apply letters to things, using one letter for one thing, when that’s what 
seems to be required, or many letters together, to form what’s called a syllable, or 
many syllables combined to form names and verbs. From names and verbs in 
turn, we shall finally construct something important, beautiful and whole. And 
just as the painter painted an animal, so—by means of the craft of naming or 
rhetoric or whatever it is—we shall construct sentences…It was the ancients who 
combined things in this way. Our job—if indeed we are to examine all these 
things with scientific knowledge—is to divide where they put together, so as to 
see whether or not, both the primary and derivative names are given in accord 
with nature. For, any other way of connecting names to things, Hermogenes, is 
inferior and unsystematic. (425a-b)3 
 
1 See e.g. Brock 1990; Arieti 1991; Sallis 1996; Gonzalez 1998; Nightingale 2003. For those taking them as serious 
philological accounts, see e.g. Grote 1867; Findlay 1973; Sedley 1998; Sedley 2003.       
2 See Weingartner 1970, 14ff; Kretzmann 1971, 137; Anagnostopolous 1972, 729; Baxter 1992. Kretzmann claims 
that the result of Platonic dialectic might be an ideally precise language (1971, 137), while Baxter maintains that a 
perfect language serves as a prescriptive ideal for a precise terminology (1992, 48ff.). Against the idea that Plato 
envisions an ideal language at all, see e.g. Kahn 1973, 167; Gonzalez 1998, 78ff.  
3 All translations from the Hackett edition of the text, translated by C. D. C. Reeve. 





Given this insistence on a strict correspondence between letters, syllables, names, and sentences 
and the world, I propose the following as a working account of an ideal language: 
(IL) An ideal language contains a vocabulary that is fixed, precise and systematic; 
a one-to-one correspondence between names (and their constituents) and things 
eliminates all ambiguity of meaning. There is an exclusive preference for direct 
statement, and all propositions in an ideal language are (analytically) true.4   
 
Notice that while the establishment of the ideal language might require dialectical analyses, its 
establishment would render dialectic superfluous.5 On my reading, Plato’s Cratylus provides 
two arguments against the suitability of imitation as grounding an ideal language and three 
independent arguments against the possibility and desirability of an ideal language.  
 After seemingly defending the naturalist view of names for the bulk of the dialogue, 
Socrates quickly reverses course and begins attacking it when Cratylus endorses and takes over 
the position. He employs two powerful arguments against Cratylus, which seem clearly to 
undermine the idea that imitation will provide the methodological basis for an ideal language. 
The first is the well-known ‘two Cratyluses’ argument (432b-e).  Reflecting on the nature of 
imitation, Socrates asks: 
Suppose some god didn’t just represent your color and shape the way painters do, but 
made all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth and softness, and put motion, 
soul, and wisdom like yours into them—in a word, suppose he made a duplicate of 
everything you have and put it beside you. Would there then be two Cratyluses or 
Cratylus and an image of Cratylus? 
 
When Cratylus concedes that there would be two Cratyluses, Socrates draws the implication 
that imitation must be abandoned: 
…we must look for some other kind of correctness in images and in the names we’ve 
been discussing, and not insist that if a detail is added to an image or omitted from it, it’s 
no longer an image at all. Or haven’t you noticed how far images are from having the 
same features as the things of which they are images? 
 
Socrates is here responding to Cratylus’ insistence that names perfectly represent or not 
represent at all. The central philosophical point is that, if one insists on the perfection or ideality 
of language, then one cannot make imitation the basis for correctness. Indeed, doing so has 
absurd consequences: 
[N]ames would have an absurd effect on the things they name, if they resembled them in 
every respect, since all of them would then be duplicated, and no one would be able to 
say which was the thing and which was the name. 
 
4 See Russell 1985. Bertrand Russell describes a philosophically ideal language thus: “In a logically perfect 
language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding 
fact…[T]here will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be 
expressed by a combination of words” (1985, 58). Russell again: “A language of this [ideal] sort would be 
completely analytic” (1985, 58).  
5 See Berger 1971, 223-224. As he puts, it “the [ideal language] theory seems to demand tautological 
descriptions…because it renders thought, judgment and dialectic superfluous” (1971, 223). See also Kahn 1973, 
167. 





In this case, we would not even be able to tell the difference between a name and its referent. 
Socrates concludes this argument by counseling Cratylus to give up the idea that a perfect 
language is attainable assuming that imitation or representation is the basis for it: 
Don’t insist that it have all the letters and exactly resemble the thing it names, but allow that an 
inappropriate letter may be included. But if an inappropriate letter may be included in a name, an 
inappropriate name may be included in a phrase. And if an inappropriate name may be included in a 
phrase, a phrase which is inappropriate to the things may be employed in a statement. Things are still 
named and described when this happens, provided the phrases include the pattern of the things 
they’re about.  
 
This argument shows that no system of names based on imitation could possibly satisfy the 
conditions of [IL].6   
 The second argument shows that there are some things that imitation will not be able 
will be beyond to represent at all. Socrates presents the example of number as a counterexample 
to any imitation theory:  
 
Consider numbers, Cratylus, since you want to have recourse to them. Where do you 
think you'll get names that are like each one of the numbers? (435b-c).  
 
It is impossible to come up with an imitative principle that would explain the names for 
numbers. Socrates seems here to be pointing to both a conceptual problem, namely, how could 
we come up with an imitative principle for numbers at all, and an extensional problem, namely, 
how could an imitative principle cover all of the numbers. To this we might add a further 
problem, implicit in my view in Socrates’ formulation of the principle. At least on Cratylus’ 
version of the imitation theory, it would seem that the motions of the tongue and mouth imitate 
the motions of the world (426c-427d); this would seem to preclude imitation from representing 
the metaphysical stability of numbers. Worse, at least from Plato’s perspective, imitation would 
not seem able to imitate the stable, eternal and immutable forms, at least not insofar as they are 
stable, eternal and immutable.7 If certain objects are beyond the scope of imitation, it can hardly 
provide the basis for an ideal language.  
 
II. Against Ideal Language in General 
Even granting that imitation is ill-suited to the task, some scholars have wanted to attribute to 
Plato the view that one ought to try to construct an ideal language, or at least a technical 
terminology, in which all names are precisely defined. According to this view, Plato wants us to 
use the results of dialectical analyses to establish an ideal language, wherein each name is 
precisely defined by an account of the essence, the what-it-is, of the thing to which it refers. On 
my reading, three of Socrates’ arguments can be generalized in such a way as to reveal the more 
ambitious achievement of an ideal language to be impossible and the less ambitious aspiration 
to establish a fixed technical terminology to be misguided. The first argument concerns the 
conditions of establishing an ideal language; the second, the temporal nature of names; and the 
last, the possibility of eliminating ambiguity from language.   
 
6 Weingartner clearly sees that the argument rules out the possibility of “perfect representation regardless of what 
the mode of representation might turn out to be” (1970, 12). 
7 For a more detailed analysis, see [citation omitted or blind review] 




First, in order to be developed, an ideal language would require knowledge of being in 
advance; this undermines the motivation for an ideal language in the first place. When 
describing the original establishment of the allegedly ideal language of the ancients (424c-
425b), Socrates suggests that the task would require prior knowledge of the nature of beings and 
claims that the assignment of names only occurs after the name-makers “have well divided off 
the things that are” (424d1). Socrates explicitly questions this requirement, since Cratylus’ 
theory has cut off the possibility of the name-makers ever acquiring the systematic knowledge 
required to name things accurately: “if things cannot be learned except from their names, how 
can we possibly claim that the name-makers had knowledge before any names had been given 
for them to know?” (438b5-8). This objection is specific to Cratylus’ theory, but such reasoning 
can be generalized in the following way: either the ideal language will be established on the 
basis of knowledge achieved through names or in some other way; either way, the knowledge 
and its acquisition are prior to and independent of the ideal language.8 If knowledge can be 
acquired through the use of ordinary language, and again, the need for the ideal language 
dissolves. Similar considerations apply to a technical terminology: once the work of inquiry is 
done using the ordinary name and we have precise knowledge of the object, why do we need a 
technically precise name?9  
 Second, an ideal language would have to exist a-temporally to achieve and maintain the 
necessary fixity; this is impossible. During the etymological section, the tendency of names to 
shift in composition and meaning over time is highlighted several times as an enormous 
obstacle to etymology. In refuting Cratylus’ claim that names either provide perfect imitations 
or are nonsense, Socrates adduces a counter-example, which shows that fixity is not necessary 
either for teaching or for dividing being, the dual functions of names (388b-c). Socrates refers to 
the words for ‘hardness’ in Attic and Etrerian, sklêrotês and sklêrotêr, respectively (434cff), and 
he gets Cratylus to admit that he understands what they mean. Despite presence in both names 
of an allegedly alien lambda, which is meant to indicate softness, and the differences between 
the words (sigma versus rho) that should alter their significance, Socrates manages to use both 
to pick out the notion of hardness and to communicate this notion to Cratylus. Socrates 
concludes that “both convention and usage must contribute something to expressing what we 
mean when we speak” (435b). The implications of this admission are wide-ranging, since any 
purportedly ideal language is precisely trying to exempt names from the messiness of 
convention and its ‘corrupting’ influences. But Plato seems certain that this is not possible. If 
 
8 To translate this into plausibly Platonic terms, either the knowledge on which an ideal language is based will be 
acquired piecemeal through the results of dialectic, or it will be acquired by some other means, like an eidetic 
vision of the whole. If the latter, then such knowledge must have been acquired all at once, as it were, and the 
establishment of an ideal language seems superfluous both because one already has the knowledge and because 
knowledge is ex hypothesi non-discursive. If the former, however, then there is discursive knowledge, but it can be 
acquired through the use of ordinary language, and again, the need for the ideal language dissolves. See also Partee 
1972, 130-131 
9One might object at this point that I have construed Socrates’ claim that the name-makers need to have a prior 
division of being too strongly. It is not knowledge that the name-makers need, so the objections goes, but rather a 
merely preliminary taxonomy of being into discrete objects which may serve as the foundation for inquiry. This 
understanding of Plato is implausible, I think, since Plato makes division either constitutive of knowledge (e.g. in 
Theaetetus) or part of the method of acquiring knowledge (e.g. in Sophist, Statesman and Phaedrus). It is never 
preliminary and separable in the way that the objection would need to construe it in order to have force against my 
interpretation. Indeed, these dialogues lend support to my contention that the division requirement is a knowledge 
requirement.  




we needed an ideal language or a technical vocabulary in order to communicate or learn, we 
would be in real trouble: Socrates claims that attempting to prevent convention and change from 
infecting the precision and fixity of an ideal language would be like hauling a boat up a very 
sticky ramp or, in other words, a quixotic enterprise (435c). Stability may be found only in the 
ultimate referents of names, i.e. forms, not in the names themselves. Names, like everything else 
in the physical world, change.  
Third, an ideal language would have to eliminate all ambiguity, but this is simply not 
possible. The ambiguity of names is endemic and can be seen as operative on three levels: First, 
as the revamped etymologies for episteme, bebaion, historia and others (437a2-c4) show, one 
could analyze the very same names in such a way that they indicate contradictory metaphysical 
principles. Names are ambiguous in meaning, and they can be analyzed in different and 
incompatible ways. Second, names are ambiguous in reference, since—assuming a Platonic 
account—they are used both to refer the stable natures, or essences, and the objects and 
properties which owe their unity to the stable natures. This may be taken to be an implicit 
consequence of the ambiguity in meaning.10 Third, however precisely one defines a name, it 
cannot be guaranteed that the definition will mean the same thing to everyone; unless the 
essence can simply be read off the definition, there will be a gap between the meaning and the 
reference of the name.  
  
III. Plato’s Use of Ordinary Language 
If Plato had aspired to establish an ideal language or to stipulate a technical terminology, 
we might expect that his own writing would exhibit characteristics which embody this ambition. 
An analysis of Plato’s use of language in the Cratylus, in which one finds a preference for 
ordinary language and a studied avoidance of technical vocabulary, reveals no such ambition. 
Commentators have typically failed to see this point as relevant.11  Ordinary language must be 
understood in contrast to other, more technical ways of speaking.12 However, in explicit contrast 
to (IL) above, I propose the following as a working account: 
(OL) An ordinary language contains a vocabulary that is fluid, ambiguous and 
unsystematic. It is the colloquial and customary language in which most people 
express themselves most of the time. Ordinary language contains a wide variety 
 
10 Silverman, taking his bearings from Phd. 102aff., argues that the point of the Cratylus is to demonstrate “by 
misdirection” the necessity of the distinction between the name, which refers to the form, and the eponym, which 
refers to the participants (1992, 26-7). On my account, the crucial difference is between different uses of names. 
11 Weingartner’s dismissal of this point is hardly adequate. He claims that the “use of such a language would not be 
congenial to Plato insofar as he was a dramatist and a poet”; further, he attributes to Plato a persistent modesty, 
which would rule him out as an establisher of names (1970, 21). In my view, Plato avoided technical terminology 
on principled grounds. 
12 See Ryle 1953, 167-168. According to his characterization,“[w]hen people speak of the use of ordinary language, 
the word ‘ordinary’ is in implicit or explicit contrast with ‘out-of-the-way’, ‘esoteric’, ‘technical’, ‘poetical’, 
‘notational’, or, sometimes, ‘archaic’. ‘Ordinary’ means ‘common’, ‘current’, ‘colloquial’, ‘vernacular’, ‘natural’, 
‘prosaic’, ‘non-notational’, ‘on the tongue of Everyman’, and is usually in contrast with dictions which only a few 
people know how to use, such as the technical terms or artificial symbolisms of lawyers, theologians, economists, 
philosophers, cartographers, mathematicians, symbolic logicians and players of Royal Tennis. There is no sharp 
boundary between ‘common’ and ‘uncommon’, ‘technical’ and ‘untechnical’ or ‘old fashioned’ and ‘current’” 
(1953, 167-8). He claims that it is difficult to pin down exactly what ordinary language is since, as Ryle puts it, 
“[t]he edges of ‘ordinary’ are blurred” (1953, 168). 




of syntactical constructions, some of which are not truth-functional (e.g., 
exclamations).  
 
The Cratylus portrays a conversation by employing for the most part ordinary language, and 
this can be seen in the use of colloquial diction, comedic imagery and a wide variety of 
syntactical constructions. 
Plato’s use of colloquial diction is very well attested, and the Cratylus is no exception.13 
A name is compared to a shuttle and a drill and the original name-maker, to a carpenter and a 
blacksmith (388aff.).14 To take one prominent example, Plato uses the terms glischōs (414c) and 
glischra (435c) to mean ‘resisting in a sticky manner,’ a usage only found in Aristophanes.15 
Plato employs comic imagery in the majority of his dialogues;16 in this dialogue, for example, 
Socrates provides a wickedly funny image of Heracliteanism, claiming their metaphysics makes 
things out to be like “leaky cups” and “people with runny noses” (440c-d). The speakers make 
use of a wide range of grammatical forms, syntactical constructions, etc., and there is no 
exclusive preference for propositions that faithfully and clearly communicate already 
established truths.17 Agreement, especially in response to Socrates’ questions, is often expressed 
elliptically18 and we also find a plethora of questions, exclamations, oaths, demonstratives, and 
vocatives. If anything, the favored construction is the question.  The use of colloquialisms, 
comedy, imagery in general, and perhaps even questions would fall away once a technically 
precise language was established. Thus, Plato’s own use of language thus seems to indicate that 
the language of philosophy is contiguous with, and not radically distinct from, ordinary 
discourse.  
 Plato does not, of course, merely rely on what ordinary language provides him.  He was 
a very prodigious coiner of words.19 However, Plato’s gestures at terminology rarely extend 
beyond a very limited conversational framework.20 In his essay on Plato’s use of language, 
Campbell concludes that “in Plato…philosophical terminology is incipient, tentative, 
transitional”; in other words, it is not terminology in the relevantly precise sense at all.21 Words 
may of course be taken up and incorporated into the larger philosophical discourse, but their 
usefulness for inquiry appear limited to the particular context of their utterance. Even when 
 
13 See Tarrant 1946; Tarrant 1958; Campbell 1973, 280ff.   
14 This recalls Alcibiades’ complaint about Socrates in the Symposium that “he always talks about asses, or 
blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners” (221e). Cp. Grg. 491a: “You simply never stop talking about cobblers, 
cleaners, cooks and doctors”; and Hp. Ma. 288d1, where such “vulgar talk” is decried as “uncultured.” See 
Campbell 1973, 280-6. Nor does Plato shy away from outright obscenity—there is no example from the Cra., but 
in Grg., the life of the hedonist is compared to that of the ‘dirty bird’ that defecates while it eats, the man who 
constantly scratches himself, and the passive homosexual who gets his fill of what he needs (494b-d).  
15 Cp. Ar. Ach. 452; Pax 482; Plato Cri. 53e; Rep. 488a. For an analysis of the phrase, see Williams 1982, 93. 
16 See Brock for an account of the comic inheritance (1990, 42ff.). 
17 In Attic Greek, we might expect a gnomic aorist rather than the present indicative for such true propositions, but 
the dialogue shows no preference at all for the gnomic aorist.  
18 See Campbell 1973, 213-7. 
19 See Campbell for a fairly extensive selection (1973, 260-79); Brock comments that the “full list would be 
immense” (1990, 44). 
20 While Plato will have his interlocutors define or attempt to define a term, he conspicuously avoids a technical 
philosophical vocabulary (of the sort that one finds in Aristotle). What successfully defined terms do emerge in a 
given dialogue are never carried over into another dialogue. Cp. Theaetetus 184c; Statesman 261e and Euthydemus 
277e-278b. 
21 Campbell 1973, 292. For eidos and idea, see 294-305; for other terms, 305-40. 




Socrates does seem to use some words in a technical sense, they are not established in a way 
that rules out other uses, as they would have to be in an ideal language. In fact, Plato seems 
almost whimsical both in his repetitions of the same word with a different meaning and his 
introduction of synonymous words for no apparent reason.22 In order to bring this point out, it 
will be helpful to look at the Cratylus’ use of a familiar ‘term’ from Platonic dialogues:  eidos, 
the vox propria in the dialogues for ‘form.’ Most instances of eidos in the dialogue are clearly 
not specialized.23 The only candidate for technical use is the controversial “name-form” (387d-
390e), and many scholars have noticed that Socrates is not using eidos in the same sense 
throughout.24 Though I will not purse the point here, it is at least possible that Plato deliberately 
exploits an ambiguity in the meaning of eidos: it can refer to the ‘nature’ of something or its 
‘physical shape’ or ‘look.’25  
From these considerations, we might conclude that ordinary language is good enough 
for philosophical discourse. It is not hopelessly inadequate, systematically misleading and/or in 
need of a major overhaul. In the context of certain conversations, we might need to precisely 
define a term or come up with a new term, but these emendations to language are, I suggest, 
context-dependent. What we should certainly not expect is that the coining of words can 
function as a reliable philosophical methodology, whereby we can somehow firmly affix words 




22 Campbell 1973, 251.  
23 In the first instance of eidos, Socrates asks to include actions in “eidos of the things that are” (386e8); the term 
here means something like ‘class’ (cp. 411a1) but surely is not meant to indicate forms in the ‘theory of forms’ 
sense. In fact, when Socrates is most likely to be talking about forms in this stronger sense in the “dream” passage, 
he does not use eidos at all but rather idea (439c).  
24 See e.g. Luce 1965; Calvert 1970. Some very good articles have attempted to disentangle the web in this 
passage: see e.g. Calvert 1970; Kretzmann 1971; Anagnostopoulos 1972; Bestor 1980; Silverman 1992. Calvert 
recognizes the ambiguity but attributes it to the “bewilderment in his thought at the time of writing the Cratylus”; 
he also criticizes Plato for failing to keep his terms straight (1970, 34).  
25 If, in the end, eidos—the best candidate for a technically precise term—turns out to be a case of intentional 
ambiguity, then this tells decisively against the idea that Plato wants to correct ordinary language and establish an 
ideal one, since ambiguity was one of the ‘problematic’ features of language which an ideally precise language 
purports to eliminate. One might justly wonder, to what end Plato might employ ambiguity? The answer can only 
be to provoke us, his readers, to pursue the argument to see where it goes wrong so that we can see which parts of 
the view put forth can be saved and which must be jettisoned. One might want to protest here Plato precisely wants 
us to clear up the ambiguity and to formulate a clear and appropriate account of what a name is and thus infer that 
my placing philosophical significance on the ambiguity is misguided. In my view, this is not a very powerful 
objection. It is one thing to say that conversational contexts often require disambiguation in order to get clear on 
the topic at hand. It is quite another to say that such ambiguity should and can be eliminated tout court by 
establishing a precise terminology or formulating a timelessly true proposition. Indeed, the pedagogical 
exploitation of ambiguity is arguably not limited to the Cratylus. On Plato and ambiguity, see Robinson 1941; 
Robinson 1942; Sprague 1962. Nor is Plato’s insistence on using eidos in both technical and ordinary senses. In 
general, the exploitation of the ambiguity of language we find here seems to take us rather far from the ideal of an 
ideal language. If the exploitation of ambiguity is appropriate and useful for philosophical inquiry, then the 
construction of an ideal language which rules out or eliminates ambiguity would run counter to the intentions of 
philosophy. Plato’s playfulness with language—his proclivity for puns, use of oxymoron, etc.—often exploits 
double meanings and ambiguities in the language (see Campbell 1973, II.ii.d: “§22: Playing with words” (290-1).). 
So too do the etymologies, especially insofar as they provide multiple explanations for the same word and play on 
the multiple meanings. 




In this paper, I hope to have shown Plato does not endorse imitation as a means for establishing 
an ideal language; that he denies the possibility and desirability of an ideal language; and that he 
does not think ordinary language is unsuitable for philosophical discourse. The aspiration to 
establish an ideal language is misguided and names will always only imperfectly refer to the 
things themselves, i.e. stable natures or forms. Despite the imperfection, the two purposes 
attributed to names, to teach and to divide being, can be achieved. Only through a certain kind 
of use of ordinary names—dialectical question and answer (390c-d)—will names be able to 
teach and divide being. This kind of use, however, requires shifting one’s focus away from 
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